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In financial markets valuable information is rarely circulated homogeneously, be-
cause of time required for information to spread. However, advances in communica-
tion technology means that the ‘lifetime’ of important information is typically short.
Hence, viewed as a tradable asset, information shares the characteristics of a perish-
able commodity: while it can be stored and transmitted freely, its worth diminishes
rapidly in time. In view of recent developments where internet search engines and
other information providers are offering information to financial institutions, the
problem of pricing information is becoming increasingly important. With this in
mind, a new formulation of utility-indifference argument is introduced and used as a
basis for pricing information. Specifically, we regard information as a quantity that
converts a prior distribution into a posterior distribution. The amount of informa-
tion can then be quantified by relative entropy. The key to our utility indifference
argument is to equate the maximised a posterior utility, after paying certain cost
for the information, with the a posterior expectation of the utility based on the a
priori optimal strategy. This formulation leads to one price for a given quantity of
upside information; and another price for a given quantity of downside information.
The ideas are illustrated by means of simple examples.
The role and importance of information and its costing has long been recognised in
economics literature [1]. Nowadays, people often obtain information through internet search
engines; but the very concept that one should search price information and utilise it to
reduce expenditure, in the context of commodity markets, has been noted for at least half a
century [2], if not considerably longer. Nevertheless, the use of information has never been
as important in the past. Indeed, accesses to internet search engines—whose objectives are
in information provision—constitute an integrated part of the lives of millions. Internet
retailers likewise not only sell products but also provide a range of information via their
recommendation engines, helping consumers find what they like but along the way also
yielding additional profits. The quality of a recommendation engine, however, is difficult to
assess if one cannot assign values to the information it provides.
Rapid developments in communication technology have their upsides as well as downsides.
On the one hand, access to targeted information has been made easy (for example, when
one knows the relevant URL from which information can be obtained), while on the other
hand a generic search for specific information is becoming harder due to the flooding of
irrelevant information that constitute noise. This is a phenomenon envisaged by Wiener,
who used the second law of thermodynamics to explain the fact that in the long run one
cannot overcome the impact of noise that overwhelms useful information, and that this
effect is in part due to the advancements of communication technology [3]. Wiener also
recognised that this inevitable flow can locally be reversed by means of innovations. It is for
this reason that internet search engines and other information providers are constantly on
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2alert of innovative ideas for information extraction and provision. Evidently, enhancement of
information extraction and provision, and implementation of innovation, cannot be realised
without cost. As a consequence, access to valuable information will likewise entail some
costs. The question then is: How do we price information?
There is a form of information that is regarded as particularly valuable—the kind of
information that allows one to anticipate, at least with some statistical significance, what is
to come, that is, to anticipate future trends. For example, suppose that a company has just
released a new product. A search engine can access various internet sites and analyse texts
(e.g., blog articles and tweets) to determine how satisfied consumers are with the product. If
customer satisfaction is high, the search engine can anticipate that future sales will increase
and hence the company will perform well. Of course, neither the data source nor the analysis
can be perfect; nevertheless, if the methodology of information extraction is adequate, then
the prediction of the search engine can be statistically significant. After a while, however,
sales figures are released, by which time the worth of this information diminishes.
The above example illustrates the idea of information diffusion. The search engine ex-
tracts information from in principle publicly available sources. Hence one need not be a large
search engine to obtain the same information at the same time. However, in practice most
people do not have the resource to analyse in real time millions of articles available on the
internet. Nevertheless, after sufficient amount of time (which can be short or long), impor-
tant information will be appreciated by a broad mass (and thus reflected in the share price,
in the above example), diminishing the worth of information as providing predictive insights.
At this stage, information has truly reached the public domain, but this is necessarily some
time after its initial appearance somewhere in ‘public’.
From the viewpoint of a search or recommendation engine, and given their resources,
capabilities, and objectives, therefore, it makes sense to extract useful information before
the public as a whole has had chance to do so, and sell it off to a third party who is in the
position to utilise this information. We can thus think of information as a tradable asset,
albeit that it will have an expiry date. In order to price information, however, we must cast
these intuitive ideas in terms of simple but precise mathematical language. The purpose of
the present paper is to show how this is done. Our analysis reveals the surprising fact that
the value of information in general need not be monotonic in the quantity of information,
because sometimes less information is more useful than more information.
To illustrate how information can be valued, let us consider a simple example. Suppose
that we are interested in the price tomorrow of a stock, whose current price is s0. Our
formulation of information pricing is applicable to a broader class of situations involving
anticipating uncertain future events. Nevertheless, we find that the example concerning in-
formation for predicting future market very convenient for providing intuitive understanding
of the theory (cf. [4]). To keep the discussion simple, let us assume a single-period setup so
that the price s0 today will become price s1 tomorrow. The value of s1 is of course unknown
today, but we assume that it satisfies a known probability law p(x). That is, we regard s1
as a random variable defined on a probability space (Ω,F ,P), where P denotes the physical
probability measure. A search engine now performs text mining to extract information rel-
evant to determining the value of s1. Evidently, no search engine is capable of identifying
the value of s1; at best, it gathers noisy information in the form of signal plus noise. In
the simplest setup, s1 itself constitutes the signal, but a search engine can only extract the
value of
ξ = s1 + , (1)
3where  represents noise, independent of s1, with known density f(x). In other words, a
search engine can sample the value of ξ, which contains new information that is not already
encoded in the value today of the stock, but not sufficient to determine the value tomorrow
of the stock. With the knowledge of ξ the prior density p(x) of s1 can thus be updated to
the posterior density
pi(x|ξ) = p(x)f(ξ − x)∫
dx p(x)f(ξ − x) (2)
in accordance with the Bayes formula. Writing piξ(x) = pi(x|ξ) for the posterior density we
define the concept of information provision as follows: It is an operation that supplies the
updated probability law:
p(x)→ piξ(x). (3)
Stated more precisely, information provision is an updating of probability law in the form of
(3) where piξ(x) is necessarily adapted to a larger filtration (i.e. information set or knowledge)
than that of p(x).
Having defined the notion of information provision, we proceed to consider the pricing
issues. Let us first illustrate the idea, and then try to formalise it. In the above example, an
uninformed investor will use the knowledge p(x) to determine the optimal asset allocation,
which may contain certain amount of stock s0, given the initial budget W0. An informed
investor is one who has purchased the knowledge piξ(x) at a cost c and used this knowledge to
determine the optimal asset allocation, given a smaller initial budget W0−c. For example, if
the p-likelihood of stock price going up is high while the pi-likelihood of this event is low, then
the informed investor will purchase smaller amount of stock so as to circumvent likely loss.
The problem then is to identify a fair value of the cost c. We would like to use a version of
utility indifference argument to determine the cost. However, as we shall indicate below, for
information pricing, the standard utility argument has to be augmented in a subtle manner
so as to determine the fair price. Let us illustrate this by means of a simple example.
Example 1.1: uninformed investor. Consider a portfolio consisting of a single risky asset s0
and a risk-free money market (bank) account. Let θ be the amount allocated to the money
market account, and φ be the unit of stock invested. Then starting with the initial wealth
W0 we have the allocation
W0 = θ + φs0. (4)
Let δ be the discount factor over the time period so that a unit cash invested in the money
market account will yield δ−1 at the end of the period. Then the terminal wealth becomes
W1 = θδ
−1 + φs1. (5)
The uninformed investor will determine the optimal asset allocation strategy (θ∗, φ∗) such
that the expected utility Ep[U(W1)] of the terminal wealth is maximised. So for example if
s1 is a binary random variable taking values {0, 1} with probabilities {p, 1 − p}, and if the
investor has an exponential utility
U(x) = 1− exp(−αx) α ∈ R+, (6)
then we have
Ep[U(W1)] = 1− e−αδ−1(W0−φs0)
(
p+ (1− p)e−αφ) , (7)
4where we have eliminated θ by use of (4). Maximising this over φ and making use of (4),
and writing s¯0 = s0δ
−1 for the forwarded stock price, we obtain the following optimal asset
allocation strategies:
φ∗ =
1
α
ln
[
(1− p)(1− s¯0)
ps¯0
]
, θ∗ = W0 − φ∗s0. (8)
The optimal expected utility of terminal wealth is thus
u(W0) = 1− e−αδ−1(W0−φ∗s0)
(
p+ (1− p)e−αφ∗) . (9)
Note that the optimisation has been performed without constraints. If short selling of either
asset is forbidden, (θ∗, φ∗) are either (0,W0/s0) or (W0, 0) depending on whether φ∗ ≥ W0/s0
or φ∗ < 0; otherwise, (θ∗, φ∗) are given by (8). 
We now consider the action of an informed investor in this simple example. We assume
that there is an information provider who has the ability to sample
ξ = s1 + , (10)
where  is a noise term independent of s1, which for simplicity of exposition we assume to
take values {0, 1} with probabilities {q, 1 − q}. In this example the value of ξ can be 0, 1,
or 2, and the a posteriori probability piξ that s1 = 0 is given by
pi0 = 1
pi1 =
p(1− q)
p(1− q) + q(1− p) (11)
pi2 = 0.
Since the information provider has to have invested capital in developing a system that is
capable of sampling ξ, and since it has to continue investments for system maintenance,
it is only reasonable to expect a payment for the provision of this information. Before we
proceed to value this cost, let us first examine the strategy of an informed investor.
Example 1.2: informed investor. Let c be the cost for the purchase of information. Then
the initial budget condition for the informed investor becomes
W0 = ϑ+ ϕs0 + c, (12)
where (ϑ, ϕ) denote portfolio positions of the informed investor. An application of the
optimisation procedure described above then yields:
ϕ∗ =
1
α
ln
[
(1− piξ)(1− s¯0)
piξs¯0
]
, ϑ∗ = W0 − c− ϕ∗s0, (13)
where piξ = P(s1 = 0|ξ). In this case, utility of the optimal terminal wealth is given by
uc(W0) = 1− e−αδ−1(W0−c−ϕ∗s0)
(
piξ + (1− piξ)e−αϕ∗
)
. (14)
Similarly to the previous example, these results are based on unconstrained optimisation. If
short selling is not permitted, for instance, then these results hold if 0 ≤ ϕ∗ ≤ (W0 − c)/s0;
otherwise we must take appropriate boundary values. 
5We are now in the position to discuss valuation of information in the above examples.
To this end we would like to employ an argument based on utility indifference, similar to
the one presented, for example, by Grossman and Stiglitz [5]. The argument intuitively
goes as follows. If possession of extra information at no cost provides on average a better
payoff, then every investor would sought to be informed. Consequently, there should be a
positive value assigned to this information. If on the other hand the price is too high, then
no one would want to be informed. Hence there exists an equilibrium level for the cost of
information at which investors are indifferent, as far as their preferences are concerned.
Naively, one might then identify the utility indifferent price of information by solving the
following equation for c:
u(W0) = uc(W0) (15)
so that the expected utility of the a posteriori optimal strategy after paying for the informa-
tion equals the utility of the a priori optimal strategy. This is in effect the pricing formula
proposed by Amendinger et al. [6] (see also [7]). The intuition behind this relation is as
follows: Provided that the cost c is sufficiently small, the possession of additional relevant
knowledge, in the form of a strictly larger filtration, necessarily increases expected utility.
Since utility is a decreasing function of the cost c, there must be a positive number c∗ such
that (15) is satisfied for c = c∗. In the context of information pricing, however, this intuitive
argument fails to determine the correct value of c∗. With a further reflection, the reason
for this becomes apparent: Ignorance can make people happy. While it is true that with
the additional knowledge an investor will on average perform better (cf. [8]), an uninformed
investor can be more optimistic about the future outlook. Take, for instance, an extreme
case where the a priori probability that the stock price moving up by a significant amount is
high. An uninformed investor will thus put the majority of the initial wealth into purchasing
this stock. Suppose, however, that the a posteriori probability indicates that the stock price
is more likely to move down. An informed investor will thus only invest a small fraction
of the initial wealth into this stock to avoid a large loss. In this case, a likely scenario is
that an informed investor knows that there is little prospect of making a large profit (i.e.
small utility), but manages to prevent a loss, while an uninformed investor has a very high
hope (i.e. large utility), but ending up with a loss. According to the pricing formula (15),
therefore, the information cost becomes negative in such a scenario.
Grossman and Stiglitz [5] (see also [9–11]), on the other hand, propose the use of the
following identity to fix the cost:
Ep[U(W ∗p )] = Ep[U(W ∗pi,c)]. (16)
Here, W ∗p = θ
∗δ−1 + φ∗s1 denotes the random variable associated with the terminal
wealth based on the implementation of the a priori optimal strategy (8); whereas W ∗pi,c =
ϑ∗δ−1 +ϕ∗s1 denotes the random variable associated with the terminal wealth based on the
implementation of the a posteriori optimal strategy (13), having paid c for the information.
In the present example, (16) leads to the pricing formula
c∗ =
δ
α
ln
[
1
qs¯0(1− q)1−s¯0
]
. (17)
The shortcoming of the Grossman-Stiglitz pricing formula (16), however, is that the cost is
fixed irrespective of its quality. For example, if the realised value of ξ is either 0 or 2, and if
6FIG. 1: Left: Expected utilities Epi[U(W ∗p )] for ξ = 0, 1, 2 as a function of the cost c are shown
here as three horizontal lines. For each value of ξ we also plot Epi[U(W ∗pi,c)], when short selling
is strictly prohibited. When c is sufficiently small, the latter utilities are higher, but as the cost
increases, they decrease. At c = c∗ the two utility functions for each ξ agree and determine the
unique equilibrium price for which the investor is indifferent. Here we have chosen parameters to
be α = 0.1, s0 = 0.5, W0 = 5, p = 0.4, q = 0.7, and δ = 0.95. The numerical values for the cost
for each ξ are plotted as a histogram on the right side. In this example, we have c∗(0) = 1.51,
c∗(1) = 0.71, and c∗(2) = 1.65. The average cost is c¯∗ = 1.10.
there is no cap on short selling, then an investor can purchase this information for a modest
cost to make infinite profit, leading to an arbitrage because starting with zero initial wealth
W0 = 0 one can construct a portfolio such that E[W1] = ∞ under any measure equivalent
to P. In contrast, in our theory we would like the cost of information be infinite, if this
information were to provide infinite benefit.
With this in mind, we deduce that the ‘correct’ pricing formula is given by solving
Epi[U(W ∗p )] = Epi[U(W ∗pi,c)] (18)
for c. In other words, we consider with hindsight what would have happened to the unin-
formed strategy, and compared this with the informed strategy. In this way, a consistent
price for information can be deduced. We propose this to be the basis with which information
can be priced using a utility indifference argument.
In the case of the above example, (18) amounts to solving
e−αδ
−1(W0−φ∗s0) (piξ + (1− piξ)e−αφ∗) = e−αδ−1(W0−c−ϕ∗s0) (piξ + (1− piξ)e−αϕ∗) (19)
for c. This gives
c∗ =
δ
α
ln
[
piξe
αs¯0φ∗ + (1− piξ)eαφ∗(s¯0−1)
piξeαs¯0ϕ
∗ + (1− piξ)eαϕ∗(s¯0−1)
]
, (20)
7which makes it apparent that when φ∗ = ϕ∗, i.e. when ξ provides no additional information
(which can happen in the present example if for instance p = q = 1
2
and ξ = 1), or when
the additional information provided by ξ results in no change of the strategy, the cost is
identically zero. Note that the dependence of piξ on ξ implies that the value of c
∗ also
depends on ξ. Thus, for instance if ξ = 0 or ξ = 2, and if unlimited short selling is allowed,
then c∗ = ∞ as desired. In many cases the dependence on ξ is natural, because different
values of ξ embody different information contents. On the other hand, there are likewise
many cases where it is desirable to associate fixed price for information. This applies to the
provision of generic information, whereas for the purchase of a specialised information, it
might be unreasonable to expect a flat rate for the information, irrespective of its content
or quality. We shall therefore consider both cases.
If short selling is prohibited, then even with the knowledge ξ = 0 or ξ = 2 an investor
can only make finite profit. Hence in this case the cost should also be strictly bounded. In
figure 1 on the left panel we plot Epi[U(W ∗p )] for three values of ξ as functions of c (clearly,
Epi[U(W ∗p )] for each value of ξ is constant in c), and compared these with Epi[U(W ∗pi,c)] as
functions of c, when short selling is forbidden. For each value of ξ the intersection of the two
functions determine the cost c∗(ξ), shown as a histogram also in figure 1. For the parameter
values chosen in this example, the ‘upside’ information (when ξ = 2) is worth a little more
than the ‘downside’ information (when ξ = 0). In this way we are able to assign prices
for information of specific quality. If we are interested in assigning a flat rate c¯∗, then we
average individual cost according to
c¯∗ =
∑
k
P(ξ = ξk)c∗(ξk). (21)
In the present example we have P(ξ = 0) = pq, P(ξ = 1) = p(1 − q) + (1 − p)q, and
P(ξ = 2) = (1−p)(1− q), which can be used to determine c¯∗. Since the a priori expectation
of our pricing formula (18) gives the Grossman-Stiglitz formula (16), we see that solutions
to (16) and (18) correspond, respectively, to an annealed average and a quenched average
often considered in the spin-glass theory. In particular, on account of Jensen’s inequality we
see that the Grossman-Stiglitz cost is the lower bound of our flat-rate cost c¯∗.
Having introduced our framework for information pricing, the next objective in this paper
is to express the cost in terms of the quantity of information so that we are able to quote
the price in the form, for example: “£X for Y bits of upside information”. This is highly
desirable because the representation of the cost as a function of ξ is not very practical. Our
definition of information as a quantity that generates the transformation (3) allows us to
proceed by the consideration of relative entropy between the a priori and the a posteriori
probabilities. The examples considered above, however, are too restrictive, because the a
priori and the a posteriori probabilities are not absolutely continuous with respect to each
other, and thus relative entropy cannot be defined. Indeed, the idea that an information
provider can ascertain the future value s1 at time 0, which would be the case if the sampled
value of ξ is either 0 or 2, is somewhat artificial and unrealistic. We therefore consider
another simple example in which this issue does not arise.
Example 2.1: uninformed investor. We assume the setup as in Example 1.1 above, except
that the random variable s1 is assumed normally distributed with mean µ and variance σ
2.
Thus, the model is similar to the Bachelier model, rather than a geometric Gaussian model,
in that the asset price can take negative values. A straightforward Gaussian integration
8FIG. 2: Left: Cost c∗(ξ) as a function of the realised value of ξ. Right: Relative entropy I(ξ) =
I(piξ|p) as a function of the realised value of ξ. The parameter values used here are: s0 = 1,
δ = 0.95, α = 0.1, W0 = 10, µ = 1.1, σ
2 = 0.2, µ = 0, and σ
2
 = 0.2. The red curves correspond
to pieces of downside information (i.e. values of ξ that indicate decrease in s1 as compared to the
a priori expectation) and the blue curves correspond to upside information.
then gives the expected utility of terminal wealth as:
Ep[U(W1)] = 1− exp
[−α (δ−1(W0 − φs0) + φµ− 12αφ2σ2)] . (22)
It follows that the optimal allocation strategy is determined by
φ∗ =
µ− s¯0
ασ2
, θ∗ = W0 − (µ− s¯0)s0
ασ2
. (23)
If there is a restriction on short selling, then these results hold provided that 0 ≤ φ∗ ≤ W0/s0;
otherwise, φ∗ = 0 or φ∗ = W0/s0. 
Example 2.2: informed investor. An informed investor is able to purchase the sampled value
of ξ given by (1) above, except that the noise variable  is now assumed normally distributed
with mean zero and variance σ2 . In this case, a standard result in Gaussian filtering theory
[12] shows that the a posteriori probability law for s1 given ξ is also normally distributed:
s1|ξ ∼ N
(
µσ2 + ξσ
2
σ2 + σ
2
,
√
σ2σ2
σ2 + σ2
)
≡ N(µξ, σξ) (24)
The optimisation problem thus reduces to maximising
uc(W0) = 1− exp
(−α (δ−1(W0 − c− ϕs0) + ϕµξ − 12αϕ2σ2ξ)) . (25)
The result is
ϕ∗ =
µξ − s¯0
ασ2ξ
, ϑ∗ = W0 − c− (µξ − s¯0)s0
ασ2ξ
. (26)
As before, if short selling is not permitted, we have the conditions 0 ≤ ϕ∗ ≤ (W0− c)/s0 for
which (26) is valid; otherwise we must take boundary values. 
9FIG. 3: The cost c∗(I) as a function of the quantity of information I, when there is no constraint
for short selling. The solid lines in all four plots (they are identical) correspond to the parameter
values used in figure 2. While keeping other parameters fixed, the following changes in parameter
values are used, represented by dashed lines in the plots. Top left: α has been increased to
α = 0.2; top right: σ2 has been increased to σ2 = 0.4; bottom left: σ2 has been increased to
σ2 = 0.4; and bottom right: δ has been decreased to δ = 0.92. The red curves correspond to
downside information, and the blue curves correspond to upside information. The insert shows the
behaviour of c∗(I) close to the origin where c∗(I) is decreasing in I.
Let us evaluate the cost of information by the principle (18). This amounts to finding
the value for c that solves
exp
[−α ((W0 − φ∗s0)δ−1 + φ∗µξ − 12αφ∗2σ2ξ)]
= exp
[−α ((W0 − c− ϕ∗s0)δ−1 + ϕ∗µξ − 12αϕ∗2σ2ξ)] , (27)
with the solution
c∗ = 1
2
αδσ2ξ (φ
∗ − ϕ∗)2. (28)
This provides the cost c∗(ξ) as a function of the sampled value of ξ. That is, before the
purchase is made, a client of the information provider can agree to the price structure (28)
so that depending on which value of ξ the information provider produces, the client will pay
the cost appropriate for that information. If the use of a flat rate c¯∗ for the cost is desirable,
then we average c∗(ξ) over ξ under the suitable Gaussian measure. This is given by
c¯∗ =
1
2α
δσ2ξ
[
(µ− s¯0)2
(
σ−2 − σ−2ξ
)2
+
σ2
σ2ξσ
2

]
. (29)
10
FIG. 4: Left: Cost c∗(ξ) as a function of the realised value of ξ when short selling is strictly
prohibited. Right: Relative entropy I(ξ) = I(piξ|p) as a function of the realised value of ξ. The
cost c∗(ξ) measures the usefulness of information, while relative entropy I(ξ) measures the quantity
of information. The parameter values used here are: s0 = 1, δ = 0.95, α = 0.1, W0 = 10, µ = 1.1,
σ2 = 0.2, µ = 0, and σ
2
 = 0.2. The red curves correspond to pieces of downside information
(i.e. values of ξ that indicate decrease in s1 as compared to the a priori expectation) and the blue
curves correspond to upside information.
As indicated above, we wish to associate cost with the quantity of information. For this
purpose, we consider the relative entropy:
I(piξ|p) =
∫ ∞
−∞
piξ(s) ln
(
piξ(s)
p(s)
)
ds
= 1
2
[
ln
(
σ2
σ2ξ
)
+
σ2ξ
σ2
− 1
]
+ 1
2
(µξ − µ)2
σ2
(30)
between the prior and the posterior densities. It should be evident from the decomposition
ξ = s1 +  that there is a critical value ξ
†, given by the a prior expectation of s1, such that
the a posteriori density is least informative, and such that the information content increases
as the value of ξ increases or decreases away from this critical level. In other words, relative
entropy is monotonically decreasing in ξ if ξ < ξ†, and monotonically increasing in ξ if
ξ ≥ ξ†. One might therefore expect that the cost should also exhibit the same monotonic
dependence on |ξ − ξ†|. Surprisingly, however, this is not the case. The pricing formula
(28) in the Gaussian model shows that if the additional information does not alter portfolio
positions, then an investor is not going to pay for that information. As a consequence,
minimum information can be more costly (i.e. useful) than a larger quantity of information.
In figure 2 we plot the cost function c∗(ξ) where there are no constraints for short selling,
and the relative entropy I(ξ). By inverting these two functions we can determine the cost
c∗(I) as a function of the information content, as shown in figure 3 for a range of param-
eter values. Note that in the numerical plots we have converted the logarithmic basis so
that relative entropy I is measured in the conventional binary units of ‘bits’ rather than
the Shannon units used in (30). Hence the horizontal axis represents information content
expressed in binary units. We observe that costs of upside information in these examples
are always slightly higher than those of downside information, and that in each case the cost
is approximately a linear function of the quantity of information. We also find that the cost
11
FIG. 5: The cost c∗(I) as a function of the quantity of information I, when short selling is strictly
prohibited. The solid lines in all four plots (they are identical) correspond to the parameter values
used in figure 4. While keeping other parameters fixed, the following changes in parameter values
are used, represented by dashed lines in the plots. Top left: α has been increased to α = 0.2;
top right: σ2 has been increased to σ2 = 0.4; bottom left: σ2 has been increased to σ
2
 = 0.4;
and bottom right: δ has been decreased to δ = 0.92. The red curves correspond to downside
information, and the blue curves correspond to upside information.
in the unconstrained case is a decreasing function of the risk aversion parameter α in the
utility function, an increasing function of the signal uncertainty σ, a decreasing function of
the noise uncertainty σ, and a slightly increasing function of the discount factor δ.
The cost structure changes somewhat if we restrict short selling. This is because the
upside gain from exploiting additional information is restricted in this case. In particular,
if short selling (including cash borrowing) is prohibited, then the cost is bounded above
by the initial wealth W0. We plot in figure 4 the cost c
∗(ξ) as a function of ξ in the case
for which short selling is strictly forbidden. The result reveals some interesting insights: a
client of an information provider is willing to pay significantly higher costs for large down-
side information, as compared to upside information, and the increase in c∗(ξ) for upside
information is satiated relatively early. This feature of course is closely related to the model
setup chosen here: Since s1 is assumed Gaussian, purchase of the stock by any amount
can result in an unbounded loss. Therefore, investors are willing to spend the totality W0
of the initial budget as a protection against large losses, leaving behind no asset for any
investment. Conversely, investors are inclined not to spend significant portions of the initial
budget on upside information, because if there are opportunities to profit from investments,
they would not want to lose these opportunities by spending all the budgets.
Although the cost structure changes when there are constraints, we can again invert these
relations to quote unique prices for upside and downside information. The results are shown
in figure 5 for a range of parameter values. We observe that when there are constraints
12
FIG. 6: Interpolation of the information price c∗(I) from the strictly constrained case to the
unconstrained case. Top row, from left: (i) borrowing is strictly forbidden; (ii) borrowing is
capped at W0/2; (iii) borrowing is capped at W0. Bottom row, from left: (i) borrowing is capped
at 2W0; (ii) borrowing is capped at 5W0; (iii) unlimited borrowing permitted.
the price of information exhibits somewhat nontrivial behaviours as we change the model
parameters.
The two cases examined here can be interpolated by gradually relaxing the borrowing
cap, as shown in figure 6. These intermediate cases are often more realistic because of
leveraging. In the case of the example considered here we observe that by raising the cap of
borrowing to five times the total wealth the net effect is already equivalent to allowing for
unlimited borrowing. The effect of leveraging is also of interest in showing in which way the
upside and downside information costs intertwine.
We conclude by remarking that the existence of information asymmetries is not only
fundamental to modern microeconomic theory [13] but also constitutes the basis for the
existence of information providers, whose roles are becoming increasingly more important
in modern society. Our main objective here is to demonstrate in which way valuable infor-
mation can be priced in a rational manner. Although the models used here to illustrate our
pricing theory are simple, they nevertheless provide a useful conceptual guideline for evalu-
ating information in a variety of contexts. It would be of interest to extend the single-period
models considered here to continuous-time models within the context of utility indifference
pricing theory (as outlined, e.g., in [6, 7, 14]).
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